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Improving Analyses of Sanctions Busting 
 
Jonathan Golub 
University of Reading 
 
When economic sanctions are directed against a target state by a sender state, the sender 
obviously wants third countries to participate with the sanctions and can apply pressure 
on them to prevent sanctions busting behaviour. But why does sanctions busting vary, so 
that the target's trade with some third-countries increases but with others decreases? In 
this paper I offer two improvements to the analysis of sanctions busting: a theoretical 
framework that recognises how the effects of covariates on sanctions busting can only be 
identified if we treat them as more conditional than previous studies have done, and a 
gravity model that captures these conditional effects while also addressing several 
common specification errors. Applying these improvements to data for 1950-2006 




In May 2018, after the US reimposed sanctions on Iran, it sought to compel other states to 
participate.  President Trump warned (on Twitter, of course) that “anyone doing business with 
Iran will NOT be doing business with the United States.” The administration subsequently 
threatened secondary sanctions on governments that bought Iranian oil, and vowed to punish 
any commercial actors in the UK, Germany and France who were associated with Instex, a 
trading system designed to circumvent US sanctions. The effectiveness of these threats against 
sanctions busting behaviour is far from certain. This is mainly because many states have 
incentives to shirk. The Europeans were not inclined to join in the sanctions, fearing that they 
would eliminate the economic benefits that Iran expected from signing the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear accord and thus cause the carefully negotiated deal to 
unravel. In August 2018, the EU adopted its so-called Blocking Statute, which instructs 
European companies not to follow US sanctions (Jalilvand 2019:5). And via Instex they aimed 
“to compensate for the American sanctions and protect trade with Iran” (New York Times 8 
May 2019). Many non-European states – including China, Russia, India, and even Iran’s 
longstanding enemy Iraq -- also expressed their opposition to the sanctions, either because they 
had close diplomatic and financial ties to Iran, or because they were wary of being seen to cave 
in to US pressure, or simply because they feared facing costly economic disruption and higher 
prices. Iraq even announced plans to set up a system similar to Instex (26 May 2019). 
Threats of US punishment arguably also lack credibility, since all of Iran’s largest oil 
importers “are also partners with the United States on major security and diplomatic issues that 
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do not involve Iran” (New York Times 22 April 2019). Would the US really be willing to risk 
progress on these other issues by applying harsh secondary sanctions, even against its 
traditional allies? The costs to the sender of trying to enforce sanctions can easily outweigh the 
benefits (Drezner 1999, Early 2012:550).1 As of September 2019, some of Iran’s trade partners 
seemed more inclined than others to engage in sanctions busting. In Europe, seven other states 
said they would join Instex (Guardian 1 July 2019). However, two prominent former National 
Security Council members lamented “the Europeans’ inability or unwillingness to circumvent 
US secondary sanctions forcing other countries not to buy Iranian oil and goods” (Simon and 
Stevenson 2019:25), and the practical effects of Instex will most likely be extremely limited 
(Jalilvand 2019). In the Middle East, Iraq and Turkey remain determined to maintain trade with 
Iran. In Asia, initially no state came to Iran’s rescue,2 but then it appeared that China (with the 
assistance of Hong Kong) might have restarted purchases of Iranian oil (CNBC 30 May 2019). 
This example illustrates an important puzzle: why does sanctions busting vary, so that 
when sanctions bite, the target state’s trade with some third-countries increases but with others 
decreases? In this paper I argue that to draw meaningful inferences about which factors drive 
sanctions busting we need to treat the effects of covariates as far more conditional than previous 
studies have recognised, and that evaluating this conditionality statistically requires an 
extensive set of interactive terms and a particular form of gravity model. To demonstrate the 
value of my recommended approach, I re-examine whether the main covariates identified in 
previous studies effect the busting of US sanctions during the cold war period 1950-1991 and 
during the post-cold-war period 1992-2006. My empirical results significantly alter some of 
the central findings contained in previous research about sanctions busting. 
 
Previous studies of third party trade with sanctioned states 
Left to their own devices, it is generally agreed, and hardly surprising, that third party 
states will be less likely to comply with sanctions, and more likely to sanctions bust, when 
compliance is costly. Beyond simply not participating in the sanctions, third countries can 
actively pursue measures to boost the target state’s imports and exports. At the microlevel, 
firms might ignore the sanctions and pursue business-as-usual with the target, or they can go 
 
1 While the overall costs to the sender of applying sanctions can undoubtedly be high, studies disagree about the 






further and attempt to circumvent the sanctions by shifting their operations and rerouting trade 
with the target via third countries (Morgan and Bapat 2003, McClean and Whang 2010). 
 Most of the previous studies that have examined the effects of US sanctions on trade 
between target and third-states concentrate almost exclusively on the question of whether trade 
levels increase or decrease, and pay little or no attention to explaining cross-national variation. 
Caruso (2003) examines the impact of unilateral US sanctions on trade between target countries 
and other G-7 countries during 1960–2000. He found that G7-target trade rises significantly 
when the US imposes moderate sanctions but falls significantly when the US imposes severe 
sanctions. Caruso speculates that US competitors, even its allies, are more likely to bust its 
sanctions (e.g. Reagan’s sanctions on Nicaragua in the 1980s) (2003:19) but he doesn’t 
explicitly test this claim. Yang et al (2004) investigate how US sanctions affected target trade 
with the EU and Japan during 1980-98. In some instances US sanctions reduced the target’s 
trade with Japan as well as with the EU, whereas in others they caused an expansion of trade 
(2004:56). The authors speculate about what explains this variation, but they don’t test their 
ideas by including the relevant political variables in their model. Nor do they attempt to explain 
variation of target state trade with the different EU states or with states beyond the EU other 
than Japan.  
Kaempfer and Ross (2004) argue that third party states that are larger, richer, and closer 
to a target state trade more with that state and thus their domestic groups have more to lose 
from the disruptive effects of sanctions. For these states it is more politically costly to restrict 
trade via sanctions, so they will tolerate or actively facilitate sanctions busting. Kaempfer and 
Ross infer support for their hypothesis by comparing the effects of size, wealth and proximity 
of third party states on South Africa’s bilateral trade in 1981-1985 versus 1986-1990, but they 
dont directly evaluate any political or institutional variables that might explain cross-national 
variation. 
Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (HSE) (2007) evaluated how US sanctions impacted target 
state trade with third states in 1999. They found that US sanctions “often diminish the trade of 
target countries with all [their] partners” (2007:203), but “in an almost equal number of 
instances” and especially for more severe sanctions the target’s trade with third-states actually 
increases (2007:207). However, their analysis was not designed to explain cross-national 
variation. Building on HSE (2007), Yang et al (2009) study the impact of US unilateral 
economic sanctions from 1980-2003. They find that US sanctions reduce target trade with EU 
states, but that over time sanctions busting gradually increases. Although they note that the 
effect differs significantly across the target’s EU trade partners (2009:1236) they don’t seek to 
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explain this variation by introducing political variables, and they don’t compare the extent of 
sanctions busting by EU states to sanctions busting by non-EU states.  
Several studies by Early (2009, 2012) stand as the most ambitious effort to explain 
variation in third country bilateral trade with target states as a function of political and 
economic relationships. Early argues that how third country trade responds to sanctions 
depends on power, rivalry and alliance relationships. For example, we would expect that its 
sheer power would enable the US to achieve “coercive cooperation” (Martin 1992) from much 
weaker third states. We would also expect that third states that are rivals of the target state, and 
thus eager to see it weakened, would be less likely to bust sanctions, whereas third states that 
are rivals of the US and thus supportive of the US’s enemies would be enthusiastic sanctions 
busters. 
Likewise, a defense pact represents a commitment to aid an ally – and certainly to 
refrain from exacerbating its harm -- when they are materially threatened. Protecting a 
sanctioned state’s economic health (and thereby its security) by not joining the sanctions 
regime and allowing or even encouraging firms to engage in sanctions busting from its territory 
increases the likelihood that the sanctioned state will reciprocate when called upon. It also 
signals to all its other allies the credibility of a third state’s commitments. Sanctions busting 
for an ally also makes good domestic political sense since the domestic business groups it 
benefits have substantial political clout. We would also expect US allies to be sensitive to their 
security commitments and thus more reluctant to bust US sanctions. Early finds no support for 
the effects of rivalries, but that, indeed, third states that have defense pacts with the target are 
more likely to act as “black knights” and bust sanctions. Counterintuitively, though, he finds 
that “close allies of the sender are more likely to bust its sanctions” (2009:61). 
In later work, Early extends his argument in order to explain this surprising result that 
the US appears to have relatively less leverage over its allies than it does over other states. He 
proposes that the effect of alliance ties with the sender is conditional on the ally’s trade 
dependency. Early measures this as tradeshare, the ratio of an ally’s dyadic trade with a given 
state to the ally’s total trade. Conceptually, this makes good sense since it is costlier to cut trade 
with a major partner than a minor partner, and compared to trade openness --  the ratio of a 
state’s total trade to its GDP -- “tradeshare appears much more effective at capturing the 
dependency aspects of trading relations” (Gartke and Li 2003:561). In short, “third parties will 
cooperate with senders when the costs are low, but use their alliance relationships as cover to 
sanctions bust when the commercial benefits are high” (Early 2012:547). And because the US 
values the long-term benefits that defense pacts with its allies provide, it is less able to coerce 
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them to comply with sanctions. Firms from anywhere in the world that want to engage in 
sanctions busting and expand their trade with the target will thus be especially attracted to 
doing so from the territory of either a sender’s ally or the target’s ally since both sorts of allies 
are less likely to join the sanctions regime. 
Early’s results support his hypothesis that when the economic and domestic political 
costs of compliance are high for a third state (i.e. when it conducts a high proportion of its total 
trade with the target), allies will exploit the lack of US leverage and engage in sanctions 
busting. Amongst his other findings, the most notable are that both rivalry and military disputes 
between the target and a third state reduce sanctions busting, as does US relative power, that 
sanctions busting is more likely for jointly democratic dyads, and that the willingness of third 
states to bust US sanctions grew after the end of the cold war (Early 2012:566). 
 
A greater role for conditional effects 
This paper aims to improve the study of sanctions busting in two ways. First, I offer a 
theoretical framework that recognises how the effects of covariates on sanctions busting can 
only be identified if we treat them as more conditional than previously studies have done, and 
second, I construct a more appropriately specified gravity model of trade that allows us to 
identify these effects. 
My main argument can be summed up in three sentences. The defining feature of a 
“black knight” state is that it deliberately steps in and trades with a sanctioned state more than 
it would normally do. Any claim about what accounts for variation in sanctions busting 
therefore demands an explicit comparison between a covariate’s effect on dyadic trade when 
sanctions are in place and its “normal” effect when sanctions are absent. And proper model 
specification must reflect this inherently comparative reasoning with the inclusion of 
appropriate interaction terms. 
To get a clear sense of the puzzle and the improvements I’m proposing, Figure 1 depicts 
the bilateral trade of hypothetical state T with the US and with three other third states, both 






















Figure 1 Bilateral trade between a sender, target state and three third states 
Dashed grey lines indicate the presence of a defense pact. For time t the line indicating bilateral 
trade between state T and the US is crossed out to show that the US has imposed sanctions.  
 
For the purposes of this paper we are not interested in the level of US trade with state 
T or whether US sanctions reduced US trade with state T. Nor are we interested in two 
important questions that many other studies have addressed, whether US sanctions are a 
success in terms of producing either regime change or human rights improvements in the target 
state (Lektzian and Souva 2007, Bapat and Morgan 2009, McLean and Whang 2010, Escriba-
Folch and Wright 2010, Grauvogel and von Soest 2014, Bapat and Kwon 2015, Peksen 2019). 
The variation we want to explain is the level of trade between state T and the three third 
countries, each of which the US can pressure to prevent sanctions busting.  As discussed above, 
the leading explanatory variables are defense pacts between the target and third states (defense), 
defense pacts between the US and third states (defenseUS), trade dependence of the third state 
State T 
Third State A 
Third State B 
Third State C 
pact pact 
Target State T 
Third State A 
Third State B 





on the target (tradeshare), the sheer power of the US relative to the third state, dyadic 
democracy, and whether the sanctions occurred during the cold war.  
Consider how sanctions alter the “normal” effects of defense pacts between a third state 
and the target, and between the third state and the US. Numerous third states were members of 
one or both types of pact well before the US chose to impose sanctions.  For example: Canada 
had a defense pact with Turkey continuously since 1951, whereas US sanctions on Turkey 
began in 1974; Canada and the US had a defense pact at least as far back as 1950, ten years 
before the US sanctioned Cuba. Any claims about the effects of alliance relationships on 
sanctions busting only have bite if we can discern a significant change in firm and state 
behaviour once sanctions take hold, which requires a direct comparison of the effects across 
the two periods. Previous research has established that alliances increase bilateral trade (Gowa 
and Mansfield 1993, Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2000). But prior to 1974, the Canada-
Turkey defense pact probably had a relatively modest effect on their bilateral trade since 
Canada was not being called upon to deliver its side of the deal and come to Turkey’s aid. If 
allies of target states tend to bust sanctions, we would expect the pact to have a much greater 
effect after 1974, when Turkey faced the consequences of US sanctions and needed Canadian 
assistance. 
Likewise, prior to 1960, the Canada-US defense pact probably had a relatively modest 
effect on bilateral trade between Canada and Cuba. US firms, or firms from elsewhere in the 
world, would have had no particular reason to relocate their operations to Canada in order to 
reach Cuban markets. It is doubtful that the US was trying to limit trade between Canada and 
Cuba prior to its imposition of sanctions in 1960, but even if it was, once sanctions were in 
place those efforts increased dramatically. If allies of the sender are indeed most likely to bust 
sanctions, then the effect of the Canadian-US defense pact on Canada-Cuba trade should have 
increased markedly as of 1960 as Canada exploited the lack of US leverage and sheltered firms 
that flocked there to circumvent US sanctions. 
Referring back to Figure 1, to evaluate the effects of the Canada-Turkey pact on 
Canada’s sanctions busting we must therefore explicitly compare the pact’s “normal” effect at 
time t-1 when sanctions aren’t in place to its effect at time t. For model specification, this 
involves including along with all the other covariates the constituent terms defense, defenseUS, 
and sanction, as well as the interactive terms defense*sanction and defenseUS*sanction. 




H1  a target’s allies are more likely to bust sanctions: a defense pact between a target 
state and a third state has a larger positive effect on their bilateral trade when US sanctions are 
in place  
 
Sanctions also alter the effects of several other main explanatory variables.  For 
example, consider the level of a third state’s economic dependency on a target state 
(tradeshare), defined as Tradedyad/TotalTrade3rdState. The effect should be greater when 
sanctions are in place. Firms in a target state hit by a sender’s sanctions need to search for and 
develop alternative markets for their imports and exports. As Early notes (2009:56), this 
process is costly, so they are likely to concentrate their efforts and intensify interactions with 
those states which already have the relatively deepest trade links to the target. Without 
sanctions, a third state’s dependence might still matter for bilateral trade levels – for the simple 
reason that last year’s close trade partner is likely to be this year’s close trade partner – but it 
doesn’t elicit any heightened strategic behaviour by firms or any particular expansion of trade. 
For example, the Bahamas was more dependent on Libya than any other third state in the years 
leading up to the 1978 US sanctions on Libya. But prior to 1978, firms in Libya werent working 
frantically to redirect their trade with the US towards the Bahamas. If the effect of 
interdependence is unchanged – if “normal” trade between highly interdependent dyads (i.e. at 
time t-1 in Figure 1) looks just like their post-sanctions trade – this would suggest that economic 
interdependence per se doesn’t explain cross-national variation in sanctions busting. To find 
out, we need to include not only the constituent terms tradeshare and sanction, but also the 
interaction term tradeshare*sanction. 
While highly dependent third states are attractive locations once sanctions commence, 
Early claims that a highly dependent third state with a US defense pact is where businesses will 
really flock. If so, then the interactive term tradeshare*defenseUS should be much larger after 
the imposition of sanctions since it is the supposed inability of the US to enforce compliance 
on its allies that gives the term its explanatory power. Prior to sanctions, the US is not trying 
to enforce anything and there is nothing for the third country to exploit. To give a concrete 
example, the US sanctioned Libya from 1978 to 2004, and both Turkey and Italy – two of the 
countries most economically dependent on Libya -- had defense pacts with the US from 1950-
2012. Prior to 1978, Turkey-Libya and Italy-Libya trade might have been affected by their 
defense pacts with the US, and this relationship was likely affected by their trade dependence 
on Libya, but if this conditional relationship explains anything about sanctions busting then we 
should see a boost in the conditional effect after 1978. To capture this conditionality requires 
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the three-way interaction tradeshare*defenseUS*sanction. With all the terms in place we can 
test the following hypotheses: 
 
H2  A target’s more dependent trade partners are more likely to bust sanctions: a third 
state’s economic dependency on bilateral trade with the target should have a larger positive 
effect after the imposition of sanctions 
H3  US allies are more likely to bust sanctions: a defense pact between a third state and 
the US, conditional on economic dependence, should have a larger positive effect on the 
target’s trade with the third state after the imposition of sanctions 
 
Conditionality should also apply to both US coercive power and dyadic democracy, and 
perhaps also to military disputes. The effect of US coercive power on bilateral trade should be 
much greater when sanctions are in place since only then is the US actually trying to coerce 
compliance with something. And whether democratic third states are especially prone to bust 
sanctions when the US targets fellow democracies can only be determined once we explicitly 
control for whether democratic dyads already “normally” tend to trade more with each other 
regardless of sanctions (Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2000). While the evidence that 
dyads involved in military disputes will trade less than other dyads is mixed (Li and Sacko 
2002, Kastner 2007), Caruso (2003) argues that for purely financial reasons firms will avoid 
doing business with target and third states involved in military conflicts, whereas Early (2012) 
argues that for geopolitical reasons third states involved in a military dispute with the target 
state should be eager to weaken it and thus particularly reluctant to bust US sanctions. To 
discern the effect of each of these variables on sanctions busting we need to directly control for 
their effect on the “normal” amount of target-third-state dyadic trade. I therefore test the 
following hypotheses: 
 
H4  US coercive power prevents sanctions busting: relative US power should have a 
larger negative effect on bilateral trade between target states and third states when sanctions 
are in place 
H5  Democracies help democracies: dyadic democracy should have a larger positive 
effect on trade between target states and third states when sanctions are in place 
H6  Military disputes deter sanctions busting: military disputes between target states 





Finally, the effects of many covariates are likely to be conditional on system polarity 
and the end of the cold-war. The willingness and ability of other states to oppose US demands, 
the relative importance of alliance relationships, the relevance of sheer power in a more 
globalised world, the attraction associated with dyadic democracy, the mobility and thus 
sanctions busting ability of firms, arguably the collapse of bipolarity altered all of these 
(Morrow, Siverson and Tabares 1998:652, Early 2009:68, Brooks and Wohlforth 2008, 
Ikenberry et al 2009). Simply including a “coldwar” dummy does not capture this 
conditionality; it shifts the overall predicted level of trade up or down as polarity changes, 
while assuming that the effects of the other covariates remain constant. Instead, one needs to 
either split the sample by time period or add a battery of interaction terms (Gowa 2011, Gowa 
and Mansfield 1993, Morrow, Siverson and Tabares 1998, Mansfield and Bronson 1997).  
 
H7: The end of the cold war altered the effects of covariates on trade between target 
states and third states 
 
To be clear, this article is certainly not the first to highlight the importance of conditional effects 
and the need for interaction terms to evaluate them. That ground has already been covered in 
detail (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006), and several studies of bilateral trade include 
interactions to assess the effects of covariates (Mansfield and Bronson 1997, Mansfield, Milner 
and Rosendorff 2000, Bayer and Rupert 2004, Kastner 2007, Carnegie 2014). My claim is that 
to improve our understanding of sanctions busting we must pay much greater attention to the 
conditional effects of covariates. 
 
Data and methods 
In order to evaluate the effects on sanctions busting of any covariate, several steps are 
necessary. First, it is essential to directly compare the level of trade in years with and without 
sanctions within a single gravity model that includes all of the relevant covariates. Gravity 
models dominate the study of international trade. Based on an analogy to Newton’s law of 
universal gravitation, we should expect that the level of bilateral trade for any two countries is 
directly proportional to the product of their sizes (GDPs) and inversely proportional to the trade 
frictions or barriers that separate them (e.g. distance, language, hostility etc.). Fitting a 
complete gravity model of bilateral trade levels for all dyads and years is standard practice. 
Examples include evaluating the effects of WTO membership (Rose 2004, Carnegie 2014), 
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alliances (Gowa and Mansfield 1993, Bayer and Rupert 2004), regime type (Mansfield, Milner 
and Rosendorff 2000), defense pacts (Long 2003), armed conflict (Long 2008), similarity of 
political interests (Kastner 2007) and most importantly, of sanctions (Hufbauer et al 1997, 
Caruso 2003, HSE 2007, Slavov 2007, Yang et al 2004, 2009).  
Using the estimated coefficients from the fitted model, one then examines the 
counterfactual by calculating the difference between two sets of predicted bilateral trade flows, 
“assuming first the absence of sanctions and then the presence of sanctions” (HSE 2007:207, 
see also Yang 2004). In Stata, this is done quickly by using the –margins-- command with the 
–contrast— option. 
To obtain reliable estimates about the determinants of sanctions busting, I recommend 
that analysts employ a particular form of the gravity model because it has several advantageous 
features. In their review of problems commonly found in gravity models, Baldwin and Taglioni 
(2007) assign medals to the worst specification errors. The gold medal goes to ignoring bias 
caused by the correlation between included and unobservable determinants of bilateral trade, 
and “the most promising approach [to mitigate such endogeneity bias], lacking compelling 
instrumental variables, is to include country-pair fixed effects” (Head and Mayer 2014:36, see 
also Baldwin and Taglioni 2007:805 and Baier and Bergstand 2007). I return to this issue below 
when discussing robustness checks. 
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) have shown that log-linear models – like those used in all 
the gravity model studies cited above -- are inherently problematic because of 
heteroskedasticty. Their experiments show that “overall, except under very special 
circumstances, estimation based on the log-linear model cannot be recommended” (2006:648).  
Various methods of obtaining robust or adjusted errors don’t suffice because they only affect 
the estimated standard errors and have no effect at all on the estimates of the parameters.  
Instead of log-linear models of trade flows, to get consistent estimates analysts should instead 
fit the gravity equation using a Poisson model with cluster-robust standard errors (Silva and 
Tenreyro 2006:645). Cluster-robust standard errors also address potential problems of 
overdispersion and serial correlation (Cameron and Trivedi 2010:633). 
An important additional advantage of fitting a Poisson model is that it “provides a 
natural way to deal with zero values of the dependent variable” (Silva and Tenreyro 2006:645). 
In the Poisson, the dependent variable is simply the level of dyadic trade, which can be zero, 
whereas with traditional log-linear gravity models the log of zero is undefined. Dropping 
observations where dyadic trade is zero, as most studies with log-linear models do (HSE 1997, 
Slavov 2007, Caruso 2003, Long 2008) wastes potentially important information. Adding one 
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then logging should be avoided since it makes the results heavily dependent on the scale used 
and thus effectively meaningless (Head and Mayer 2014:51), and it generates inconsistent 
estimates of the parameters (Silva and Tenreyro 2006:643). Including cases of zero trade 
between target and third states is especially important when studying sanctions, since the 
fundamental objective of the sender is to produce more such cases. For example, the US had a 
healthy trade relationship with Cuba before it imposed sanctions in 1960. That US-Cuba trade 
fell sharply thereafter, reaching zero for the period 1963-1976, is enormously important 
information. Likewise when studying sanctions busting. Of all the third states trading with 
Libya, the Bahamas was consistently the most dependent throughout the 1970s. After the US 
imposed sanctions on Libya in 1978, its trade with the Bahamas eventually dried up, dropping 
to zero from 1988 onwards. Why Libya’s trade with the Bahamas reduced to zero whereas its 
trade with other third states remained robust or even expanded is precisely the sort of puzzling 
variation that requires explanation. 
To address the problems identified above, I fit Poisson models of dyadic trade, 
specifying dyadic fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by dyad. All variables are 
measured yearly. I use data from HSE (2007) to examine the effects that US sanctions had on 
third-state trade with target states from 1950 to 2006. The unit of observation is the dyad-year, 
with dyads composed of a state that at some point was the target of one of the 122 episodes of 
US sanctions and every other “third” state in the world apart from the US. There are a total of 
71 different target states, and 199 different third states. The main dependent variable is the 
value of total dyadic trade (imports plus exports) each year as recorded in the Correlates of 
War Trade Dataset 4.0 (Barbieri and Keshk 2016). Most studies of sanctions use this sort of 
combined measure because US sanctions can hit target state imports as well as exports. But 
since my hypotheses should apply to both bilateral imports and bilateral exports between target 
states and third states, I also fit models with each of these as the dependent variable. Ignoring 
missing values, the dataset is an unbalanced panel that contains 538,666 observations. 
For the independent variables, a dummy sanction takes the value of one in years when 
a state was the target of US sanctions. Two core gravity variables, found in nearly all previous 
studies of trade flows, are the logged products of the dyadic states’ real GDPs and their 
populations (Gleditsch 2014). I exclude several other potential core variables such as dyadic 
distance, contiguity, shared official language, past colonial relationship, and whether both 
members of the dyad are islands or landlocked because their values remain constant over time 
and with the fixed effects design they would just drop out of the analysis. 
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For the main variables of interest, I use data from Gibler (2009) to code whether the 
third country has a defense pact with either the (eventual) target state (defense) or with the US 
(defenseUS). The variable tradeshare is constructed from the COW Trade Dataset and 
measures the trade dependence of the third state on the (eventual) target, lagged by one year to 
avoid endogeneity. For the US’s coercive power, powerUS codes the (logged) relative military 
and economic strength (CINC) of the United States compared to the third state (NMC Version 
5.0 update of Singer 1987). The dummy democ takes the value of one if both the (eventual) 
target and third state are democracies (Boix, Miller and Rosato 2012). The dummy variable 
MID measures whether the third state is engaged in a militarized international dispute with the 
(eventual) target (Maoz et al 2018). 
As discussed above, to capture how the effects of defense pacts (between target states 
and third states and between third states and the US), US coercive power, economic 
interdependency between third states and target states, dyadic democracy and military conflict 
are conditional on sanctions, I interact each of these with the sanction dummy. To capture the 
effect of defense pacts with the US, conditional on both sanctions and trade dependence, I 
include the two-way interactive term defenseUS*tradeshare and the three-way interaction term 
sanction*defenseUS*tradeshare. For (eventual) target state i, third country j, in year t, and 
ignoring estimated coefficient symbols for ease of presentation, we can represent the dyadic 
fixed effects Poisson model as follows: 
TRADEijt = exp{ln(GDPit * GDPjt) + ln(Popit * Popjt)  + Sanctionit + Defenseijt + DefenseUSjt 
+ Tradeshareijt + DefenseUSjt*Tradeshareijt  + PowerUSjt + Democijt + MIDijt + 
Sanctionit*[Defenseijt + DefenseUSjt + Tradeshareijt + DefenseUSjt*Tradeshareijt + PowerUSjt 
+ Democijt + MIDijt  ] + Dyadij}*exp(eijt)  
To test H7, ideally we would interact most of the terms in the above equation with a 
postcoldwar dummy. But data limitations made this impossible, as the multicollinearity 
produced by all the extra interaction terms caused several to drop out and prevented 
convergence. So as a second best option, I fit one model for the cold war period (1950-1991) 
and one for the post-cold war period (1992-2006). 
Table 1 reports the results. In a Poisson model, with either cross-section or panel data, 
the estimated regression coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities (Cameron and 
Trivedi 2010:346&639) that indicate the proportionate change in the dependent variable 
produced by a one unit change in the independent variable. In other words, a one unit increase 




 Total bilateral trade 3rd state imports 
from target 
3rd state exports 
to target 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 1950-1991 1992-2006 1950-1991 1992-2006 1950-1991 1992-2006 
Sanction 0.168* -0.328** 0.162 -0.412** 0.169 -0.249** 
 (0.0843) (0.0638) (0.100) (0.0832) (0.0994) (0.0862) 
Defense 0.365** 0.155** 0.396** 0.0919 0.338** 0.237** 
 (0.0825) (0.0567) (0.0821) (0.0635) (0.104) (0.0643) 
DefenseUS 0.426** 0.237* 0.494** 0.265* 0.314* 0.162 
 (0.131) (0.0938) (0.146) (0.105) (0.135) (0.114) 
Tradeshare 2.903** 3.493** 2.467** 3.436** 3.296** 3.579** 
 (0.659) (0.739) (0.723) (0.904) (0.685) (0.675) 
PowerUS -0.648** 0.0272 -0.590** 0.122 -0.705** -0.0710 
 (0.0869) (0.102) (0.0960) (0.121) (0.0936) (0.105) 
Democ -0.0297 -0.122** -0.0578 -0.147** -0.00353 -0.0898 
 (0.0468) (0.0369) (0.0565) (0.0345) (0.0507) (0.0590) 
MID -0.0516 0.0477 0.0369 0.0589 -0.143* 0.0345 
 (0.0552) (0.0353) (0.0670) (0.0446) (0.0621) (0.0264) 
Defense*Sanction -0.216** -0.123 -0.257** -0.0485 -0.178* -0.234* 
 (0.0667) (0.115) (0.0672) (0.151) (0.0841) (0.111) 
DefenseUS*Sanction -0.0965 0.166** -0.118 0.0888 -0.0669 0.310** 
 (0.0624) (0.0626) (0.0766) (0.0753) (0.0734) (0.0751) 
PowerUS*Sanction -0.00092 0.0460** -0.0180 0.0365 0.0146 0.0593** 
 (0.0197) (0.0172) (0.0231) (0.0214) (0.0241) (0.0229) 
Democ*Sanction -0.242** -0.144* -0.162** -0.0199 -0.323** -0.284** 
 (0.0585) (0.0578) (0.0581) (0.0708) (0.0796) (0.0702) 
Tradeshare*Sanction 0.632 0.267 0.862 -0.0253 0.472 0.610 
 (0.566) (0.759) (0.595) (0.788) (0.620) (0.839) 
DefenseUS*Tradeshare -0.852 0.416 -0.687 0.463 -0.966 0.415 
 (0.977) (0.535) (0.999) (0.629) (1.035) (0.547) 
DefenseUS*Sanction*Tradeshare 1.252 0.814 1.610 -0.230 0.811 1.523 
 (1.054) (1.236) (1.031) (1.537) (1.184) (1.171) 
MID*Sanction -0.0278 -0.0499 -0.198* -0.0757 0.145 -0.0239 
 (0.0829) (0.0503) (0.0977) (0.0508) (0.0997) (0.0517) 
Observations 245,726 143,778 237,628 139,394 234,295 138,222 
Dyads 8,299 10,149 7,893 9,782 7,702 9,695 
 
Table 1 Fixed effects Poisson models of target-third-state dyadic trade 
**p<0.01, *p<0.05.  Estimated coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by dyad in 
parentheses. Controls for real GDP and population size included but not reported. 
 
Because all of the hypotheses involve conditional effects, it is essential to examine the 
combined marginal effect of the constituent and interactive terms across a range of values 
(Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006), and to compare semi-elasticities with and without 
sanctions.3 
The results strongly contradict hypothesis one which predicted that the target’s allies 
would act as “black knights” and deliberately trade with the target more than they normally 
 
3 I don’t interpret the sanctions variable by itself, since it captures the uninteresting baseline case where defense 
and defenseUS and powerUS and tradeshare and joint democracy and MID are all zero. 
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would. In neither the cold-war period nor the post-cold-war period is the semi-elasticity of 
defense significantly greater during sanctions episodes, and this finding holds for total trade, 
third-state imports and third-state exports. Moreover, during the cold war period, the 
proportionate increase in total trade due to a defense pact is significantly lower when sanctions 
are in place (model 1 ∆semi-elasticity=-.216, p<.01), so that the target’s allies actually traded 
less with it than they normally would.4 The same goes for third-state imports from the target 
(model 3) and third-state exports to the target (model 5), as well as for third-state exports after 
the cold war (model 6). While target-third-state defense pacts might provide military security, 
it appears they offer no reassurance that the target’s allies will act as black knights to help 
mitigate the economic damage of US sanctions. 
Hypothesis two also enjoys no support. My expectation was that once sanctions took 
hold, and regardless of any alliance considerations, foreign firms (including those from the 
sender state) would divert their activities to the target’s most dependent trade partners, so that 
the difference in target-third trade levels between highly dependent and minimally dependent 
third states would be far greater than normal. However, economic dependency per se has no 
unconditional effects on sanctions busting, as the difference in semi-elasticities is statistically 
insignificant during both time periods. This finding holds for total trade as well as for third 
state imports and exports. 
Since my model includes interactive terms for the conditional effects, we can 
investigate how economic dependence alters target trade with US enemies by setting the value 
of the US alliance dummy to zero. This reveals the important finding that firms do not flock to 
highly dependent US enemies when the US imposes sanctions. In both time periods, in the 
absence of US defense pacts, the effect of economic dependency between third states and target 
states on their dyadic trade was slightly greater with sanctions but the difference in semi-
elasticities for total trade (290% v. 354% and 349% v. 376%) was nowhere near statistically 
significant. We obtain similar results when the dependent variable is third-state imports or 
exports. 
Hypothesis three posited that while US allies that face higher costs of cutting trade with 
a third-state might be more (or less) likely to do so if they have a US defense pact, this 
conditional effect should be larger and positive during sanctions episodes. The results support 
 
4 To obtain the semi-elasticities for covariate X with and without sanctions, I employed the following Stata 
command: margins, dydx(X) at(sanction= (0 1)). To directly obtain the difference in these two semi-elasticities, 




my argument but only for the post-cold-war period. The evidence for hypothesis three is best 
illustrated graphically with a direct comparison of the US defense pact semi-elasticities at 
different values of third-state economic dependence. Figures 1-3 present the results for total 
bilateral trade, third-state imports from the target, and third-state exports to the target.  
 
Figure 1 Conditional effects on sanctions busting (total trade) of defense pacts 





Figure 2 Conditional effects on sanctions busting (third state imports from target) 
of defense pacts between the US and third states 
 
 
Figure 3 Conditional effects on sanctions busting (third state exports to target) of 




As shown in the left panels of Figures 1-3, during the cold war sanctions busting by US allies 
was not conditional on their trade dependence on the target state. Whether for total trade, third-
state imports or third-state exports, at each level of trade dependence the difference between 
the two semi-elasticities is indistinguishable from zero. In the post-cold-war period, however, 
the US experienced a significant “alliance handicap” conditional on the ally’s costs of cutting 
trade with the target. In the right hand panel of Figure 1 we see the anticipated relationship 
between costs and sanctions busting manifest in the growing difference between the two semi-
elasticities, and the difference is statistically significant until the level of trade dependence 
reaches ten percent. At one percent dependence, a US defense pact boosts target-third total 
trade by 24.1% without sanctions, but by 41.5% with sanctions (thus a value of .174 on the y-
axis). At 10 percent dependence the handicap is even greater, as an alliance boosts total trade 
by 28% without sanctions and by 53% with sanctions. Although the hypothesis appears not to 
hold in the most likely situations, where joining the sanctions regime poses the highest costs, 
this surprising scope condition is virtually irrelevant in substantive terms since in the post-cold-
war era US allies have a trade dependence on target states greater than ten percent for only 
0.4% (640/143778) of the observations. 
Interestingly, the findings regarding a post-cold-war era US alliance handicap are 
sensitive to the choice of dependent variable. A more refined picture emerges once we 
distinguish between third state imports and exports. As shown in Figure 2, for 1992-2006 the 
US alliance handicap did not apply to third state imports, regardless of the third state’s trade 
dependence on the target. But sanctions busting by US allies was much for extensive for third 
state exports (Figure 3) than for total trade (Figure 1). At one percent dependence, a US defense 
pact boosts third-state imports from the target by 16.6% without sanctions, but by 49.1% with 
sanctions (thus a value of .325 on the y-axis). At 10 percent dependence the difference in semi-
elasticities is .462. For third state exports, the US alliance handicap remains statistically 
significant and increases in magnitude all the way up to tradeshare values of 43.5%. In other 
words, always, since in the post-cold-war era US allies have a trade dependence on target states 
greater than 43.5 percent for only 0.002% of the observations. 
The results firmly contradict hypothesis four, whether for total trade, third state imports 
or third state exports. During the cold war, a unit increase in relative US power decreases target-
third-state total trade significantly when sanctions are zero (by 64.8%), as well as when they 
are one (by 64.9%), and the difference is unexpectedly insignificant. What we see here is not 
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that during the cold war US coercive power prevented sanctions busting, but rather that weaker 
states simply traded much less with target states regardless of sanctions. Nor did relative US 
coercive power prevent sanctions busting after the cold war. Interestingly, for total trade as 
well as third-state exports, in this period the effect of US power is conditional on sanctions but 
the difference between the two semi-elasticities is positive, not negative as expected. This 
indicates that during 1992-2006 relatively weak third states traded more than normal with target 
states and were thus particularly prone to bust US sanctions.  
 For hypothesis five, there is no indication that democracies are particularly prone to 
bust sanctions on other democracies. Across both time periods, and for total trade as well as 
third state imports and exports, the difference in semi-elasticities for democ with and without 
sanctions is never positive. In fact, the direction of the effect is often negative. Instead of 
democratic trade partners of democratic targets serving as attractive locations through which 
to bust US sanctions, businesses seeking to evade US sanctions tend to flee from them. For the 
cold war period, joint democracy decreases target-third dyadic total trade by an insignificant 
amount without sanctions, but by 27.2% with sanctions. This sizeable difference in semi-
elasticities is significant at the 99.9% level. Similar results obtain when we switch the 
dependent variable from total trade to third state imports or exports. The same counterintuitive 
finding holds in the post-cold-war period for total trade (-12.2% v. -26.5%, p<.05), and even 
more so for third-state exports (-9.0% v. -37.4%, p<.01).  
For hypothesis six, the results mostly fail to confirm the expectation that the presence 
of a military dispute decreases sanctions busting. For both time periods, the differences in semi-
elasticities for the MID variable with and without sanctions are statistically insignificant for 
total trade and for third-state exports. For third-state imports the differences are significant 
during the cold war period but insignificant thereafter. There is thus little indication that third 
states involved in a military dispute with the target state are particularly reluctant to bust US 
sanctions or that they are treated as especially unattractive locations by risk-averse foreign 
firms.  
Comparing models 1 to 2, 3 to 4, and 5 to 6 confirms hypothesis seven in most respects, 
bearing in mind the important caveat that the split sample approach I used to evaluate this 
hypothesis does not allow formal statistical comparisons between the two eras as a fully 
interactive model would.  First, at least in terms of sanctions busting, defense pacts between 
target and third states proved relatively more useful after the cold war than during the cold war. 
After the cold war, allies of target states provide no particular economic cushion against US 
sanctions, whether for total trade or third state imports or third state exports, but during the 
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coldwar period things were even worse since these allies were less beneficial trade partners 
than usual precisely when they could have engaged in sanctions busting.5 Second, the curious 
relative drop in trade between democratic trade partners of democratic targets during US 
sanctions was greater during the cold war than in the more recent period. In other words, 
democratic trade partners of democratic targets were even less inclined to bust US sanctions 
during the cold war than they were afterwards.  
Third, the end of the cold war greatly diminished the ability of the US to prevent its 
allies from busting its sanctions. During the cold war, the US did not experience an “alliance-
imposed restraint”, whether for total trade or third-state imports or exports, regardless of the 
level of an ally’s trade dependence on the target. Only after the cold war have US allies been 
more likely than other states to bust its sanctions, and to do so in proportion to their cost of 
cutting trade with the target. Sanctions busting by US allies manifests in total dyadic trade with 
target states, and even more so in exports to target states, but not in imports from target states. 
Finally, the end of the cold-war also changes the effect of US coercive power on how foreign 
states trade with each other. During the cold war, third states that were much weaker than the 
US traded far less with target states than did strong third states, regardless of US sanctions. 
After the cold war, US coercive power to prevent sanctions busting erodes, or at least the 
inclination of the US to employ that power against weak third states.  
 
Robustness checks 
I tested the robustness of my findings for each of the three dependent variables against five 
different dyadic fixed effects model specifications that included additional controls. Because 
dyadic fixed effects might not fully address endogeneity bias, as a further precaution I included 
time fixed effects. I also tried fitting models with exporter and importer time variant fixed 
effects, but this produced collinearity problems and the models did not converge. Since the 
inclusion of dyadic fixed effects limits the inferences we can draw about factors that are mostly 
or completely time invariant, I also refit the models in Table 1 using random effects rather than 
fixed effects. The full results for these robustness checks are available in the appendix. 
In Table A1, I included two extra core controls that might account for changes in target-
third-state trade and which often appear in gravity models: whether the dyadic states are part 
of the same regional trade agreement (data from Larch 2008) and whether they share a common 
 
5 For one of the three dependent variables, third-state exports to the target, defense pacts were not more useful 
after the cold war, as the target’s allies continued to trade less than normal with it during sanctions episodes.  
21 
 
currency (data from de Sousa 2012). I hypothesised that tradeshare would help explain 
variation in sanctions busting because it is costlier to cut trade with a major partner than with 
a minor partner, but arguably the cost of cutting any trade relationship and thus the expected 
amount of sanctions busting should be greater the more important trade is to the third state’s 
economy. To account for this possibility, Table A2 therefore includes a measure of the third 
state’s trade openness calculated as totaltrade/GDP (lagged by one year).6 It is also possible 
that the effect of US sanctions and the sanction busting behavior of third-states depends on how 
much a third-state’s GDP relies on the target state’s economy. Moreover, since some countries 
pursue export-led growth strategies and others depend heavily on the importation of 
intermediate goods, results could differ across the three measures of the dependent variable. 
The models in Table A3 therefore include the additional control variable reliance3T, which is 
the ratio of target-third-state trade to third-state GDP. 
As mentioned earlier, Caruso (2003) found that more comprehensive sanctions 
produced greater reductions in the target’s trade with the US as well as with other G-7 
countries. While this might also apply to third states more generally, more severe sanctions 
could instead generate a greater shift of trade to third states, much like squeezing a tube of 
toothpaste harder causes more to flow out. In their dataset, HSE (1990) distinguish between 
sanctions that interrupt finance between the target and sender (F), exports from the sender to 
the target (X), and imports by the sender from the target (M). The most comprehensive 
sanctions disrupt all three channels at once, and Table A4 captures this with the dummy FXM. 
To control for the possibility that sanctions-busting is a temporally dependent phenomenon, 
with both target and third states adjusting more effectively over time to trade disruptions, Table 
A5 includes the variable timeundersanctions that measures how long the target has been the 
subject of continuous US sanctions. Table A6 includes year dummies (i.e. time fixed effects) 
to control for any macroeconomic shocks or general trend that could equally affect all dyads. 
Table A7 employs random effects rather than fixed effects and includes six time invariant 
covariates: the natural log of distance between the dyadic states and whether they are 
contiguous (Bennett and Stam 2000), whether the dyadic states share a common official 
language or a past colonial relationship (Mayer and Zignago 2011), and whether both members 
of the dyad are islands or landlocked (Early 2008). 
 
6 For these two different measures of economic interdependence we should expect opposite signs on the 




All the main findings prove robust to these alternative specifications, across the models 
with fixed effects as well as those with random effects. Only a handful of secondary findings 
differ, and these differences are due almost entirely to the choice between fixed or random 
effects. In the additional models with fixed effects, if we use third state exports as the dependent 
variable, defense pacts between targets and third states usually test out as simply irrelevant to 
sanctions busting during the cold war rather than positively detrimental for the target state. And 
with third state imports as the dependent variable, hypothesis two enjoys at least partial support 
-- for the cold war period, in several of the fixed effects models greater trade dependence of a 
third state on a target state unconditionally boosts sanctions busting. 
With random effects, the evidence for hypothesis seven is weaker, and four of the 
secondary findings from Table 1 are not robust, although it is important to remember that this 
might be an example of the “gold medal error” caused by not mitigating endogeneity bias: Both 
before and after the cold war, defense pacts between target and third states have an insignificant 
but not a detrimental effect on sanctions busting as measured by third-state exports; The US 
alliance constraint in the post-cold war era holds for third-state exports but not for total dyadic 
trade; After the cold war, across all three dependent variables, relatively weak third-states were 
no more likely than stronger states to bust US sanctions and the presence of a military dispute 
between the target and third state had no effect on but did not reduce cold war sanctions busting 
measured as third-state imports.  
 
Conclusion 
When the US sanctions a target state, why do some third states follow suit and cut their trade 
while others bust sanctions by increasing theirs? This study has sought to improve our 
understanding of sanctions busting in two ways. First, I offer a theoretical framework that 
recognises how the effects of covariates on sanctions busting can only be identified if we treat 
them as more conditional than previously studies have done. Second, I construct a gravity 
model that captures these conditional effects and also addresses several common specification 
errors. My recommendation is that these theoretical and methodological improvements become 
standard practice. To illustrate the advantages of my approach, I applied it to data for 1950-
2006, and the results significantly alter some of the central findings contained in previous 
studies of sanctions busting. 
Contrary to expectations and to extant research, my results suggest that sanctions 
busting during 1950-2006 is not the result of the target’s allies coming to its aid, or of firms 
flocking to highly dependent third states or to democratic trade partners of democratic targets, 
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or away from states engaged in military dispute with the target. Nor has the relative coercive 
power of the United States enhanced its ability to deter sanctions busting. 
My analysis reveals that democratic partners of democratic targets have proven 
particularly reluctant to bust US sanctions, and that alliance dynamics as well as the role of 
US coercive power changed considerably after the end of the cold war, at least in terms of 
their effect on sanctions busting. From 1950-1991, defense pacts proved to be a liability for 
target states, as their allies traded significantly less with them than normal once the US 
applied sanctions, whereas for 1992-2006 they had no effect on sanctions busting. By 
contrast, during the cold war defense pacts between the US and its allies had no effect on 
sanctions busting; the US did not face an alliance-imposed restraint or handicap, regardless of 
its allies’ trade dependence on the target state. After the cold war, the US’s allies became 
more likely than other states to bust its sanctions, and the extent of their sanctions busting 
increased in proportion to the potential costs of cutting trade with the target state. Finally, 
during the cold war sanctions busting by third states bore no relationship to the relative 
military and economic strength of the United States, whereas after the cold war relatively 
weak states are more likely to bust US sanctions.   
The picture of contemporary sanctions busting that emerges from employing my 
suggested approach invites future research along several lines. That the allies of target states 
are not more likely than others to act as black knights could demonstrate the inherent 
limitations of defense pacts, in that sanctions busting has always been too peripheral a 
concern to trigger alliance commitments. Even so, this still leaves the question of why the 
target’s defense pacts were actually detrimental to sanctions busting during the cold war. 
Another outstanding question is why democratic trade partners of a democratic target are 
more likely than other states to abandon it once US sanctions take effect. The precise 
mechanisms at work here deserve further study. The causal path could depend mainly on the 
perceptions and objectives of third-state decisionmakers at the macrolevel and the policies 
they introduce to promote or restrict trade. Or such policy shifts might be of secondary 
importance if the real action occurs at the microlevel, where foreign firms deliberately avoid 
democratic trade partners of democratic targets but less so than they did during the cold war. 
More work is also required to explain why, despite its supposed primacy, the US is 
now less able to prevent its allies and relatively weak states from busting its sanctions. 
Perhaps it is simply that with the demise of the Soviet threat US allies became less dependent 
on the alliance relationship and have few compelling reasons to follow US leadership, so that 
now “the US has less power and influence over others than it exerted during the Cold War” 
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(Schweller 2011:179). Ironically, it is possible that the US has come to value the long-term 
benefits that defense pacts with its allies provide more than its allies value those benefits. In 
addition, more US allies and weak states have joined international institutions (especially the 
European Union which enlarged in 1995 and 2004), and by doing so they might constrain or 
evade US power. Previous work showing that larger organizations are ineffective at 
preventing their members from busting sanctions (Early and Spice 2015) could be extended 
to examine the ability of the US to coerce members of different sized organizations into 
supporting its sanctions both during and after the cold war.  
Although it goes beyond the issue of sanctions busting, future studies could investigate 
why, across all three measures of the dependent variable, the sign on USpower shifts from 
negative and significant during the cold war to positive and insignificant thereafter. This 
suggests that in periods of no US sanctions, weak third states used to trade less with (eventual) 
targets than did strong third states, but no longer. In other words, globalisation or other factors 
appear to have shifted the trade links of certain countries away from strong states towards weak 
states. 
Another puzzle worth exploring is why some of the secondary empirical findings 
differed across the three measures of dyadic trade. There are more instances of the US 
disrupting its exports to targets than its imports from targets, so we might expect sanctions 
busting to manifest mostly in the form of greater exports from third states. Still, attention could 
focus on whether it is economically or politically easier to bust US embargoes on its exports 
than its imports. 
Finally, while I took the preventative measures of dyadic fixed effects and time fixed 
effects to mitigate potential endogeneity bias, more could be done to fully address this 
important concern. For example, it is plausible that my models suffer from omitted variable 
bias, or from reverse causality (for example if bilateral trade causes alliances and not vice 
versa). As Head and Mayer note, “the textbook solution would be to find instrumental 
variables” (2014:36), in this case particularly for third state defense pacts with target states and 
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 Total bilateral trade 3rd state imports 
from target 
3rd state exports 
to target 
 1950-1991 1992-2006 1950-1991 1992-2006 1950-1991 1992-2006 
RTA 0.531** 0.116 0.473** 0.113 0.588** 0.113* 
 (0.0937) (0.0657) (0.0983) (0.0868) (0.0950) (0.0576) 
Common currency -0.315 -0.0701** -0.320 -0.0251 -0.312 -0.131** 
 (0.235) (0.0265) (0.258) (0.0351) (0.226) (0.0365) 
MID -0.0715 0.0462 0.0187 0.0582 -0.166** 0.0319 
 (0.0523) (0.0356) (0.0644) (0.0452) (0.0589) (0.0264) 
Sanction 0.160 -0.310** 0.149 -0.397** 0.163 -0.227** 
 (0.0820) (0.0654) (0.0994) (0.0891) (0.0960) (0.0836) 
Defense 0.297** 0.160** 0.342** 0.0949 0.258* 0.241** 
 (0.0935) (0.0543) (0.0904) (0.0630) (0.115) (0.0612) 
DefenseUS 0.215 0.252** 0.292* 0.269** 0.0831 0.205 
 (0.124) (0.0918) (0.140) (0.104) (0.126) (0.112) 
Tradeshare 3.847** 3.403** 3.645** 3.384** 4.030** 3.431** 
 (0.519) (0.747) (0.599) (0.926) (0.587) (0.670) 
PowerUS -0.631** 0.0569 -0.583** 0.140 -0.683** -0.0291 
 (0.0872) (0.101) (0.0946) (0.118) (0.0953) (0.104) 
Democracy -0.0200 -0.129** -0.0481 -0.153** 0.00614 -0.0980 
 (0.0430) (0.0363) (0.0519) (0.0341) (0.0493) (0.0580) 
Defense*Sanction -0.0966 -0.118 -0.133 -0.0384 -0.0632 -0.235* 
 (0.0698) (0.113) (0.0704) (0.149) (0.0872) (0.110) 
DefenseUS*Sanction -0.0585 0.155* -0.0730 0.0763 -0.0350 0.302** 
 (0.0591) (0.0627) (0.0748) (0.0768) (0.0705) (0.0741) 
PowerUS*Sanction 9.79e-05 0.0429* -0.0167 0.0342 0.0152 0.0550* 
 (0.0190) (0.0175) (0.0227) (0.0223) (0.0230) (0.0223) 
Democracy*Sanction -0.221** -0.135* -0.137* -0.0117 -0.303** -0.277** 
 (0.0555) (0.0575) (0.0544) (0.0700) (0.0778) (0.0697) 
Tradeshare*Sanction 0.0768 0.170 0.0748 -0.143 0.136 0.527 
 (0.621) (0.731) (0.649) (0.776) (0.693) (0.803) 
DefenseUS*Tradeshare 0.597 0.251 0.653 0.397 0.634 0.0944 
 (0.805) (0.515) (0.889) (0.617) (0.825) (0.527) 
DefenseUS*Sanction*Tradeshare -0.182 0.867 0.285 -0.147 -0.770 1.652 
 (1.137) (1.154) (1.116) (1.473) (1.261) (1.103) 
MID*Sanction -0.0264 -0.0453 -0.197* -0.0724 0.147 -0.0178 
 (0.0812) (0.0504) (0.0964) (0.0518) (0.0972) (0.0518) 
Observations 239,566 143,778 231,685 139,394 228,409 138,222 
Dyads 8,024 10,149 7,630 9,782 7,442 9,695 
 
Table A1 Fixed effects Poisson models of target-third-state dyadic trade, including extra 
controls for regional trade agreements and common currencies 
**p<0.01, *p<0.05.  Estimated coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by dyad in 





 Total bilateral trade 3rd state imports 
from target 
3rd state exports 
to target 
 1950-1991 1992-2006 1950-1991 1992-2006 1950-1991 1992-2006 
MID -0.0774 0.0476 0.00553 0.0589 -0.164** 0.0346 
 (0.0486) (0.0354) (0.0605) (0.0445) (0.0555) (0.0275) 
Sanction 0.196** -0.339** 0.187* -0.418** 0.197* -0.278** 
 (0.0754) (0.0626) (0.0953) (0.0831) (0.0874) (0.0850) 
Defense 0.306** 0.151** 0.333** 0.0899 0.278** 0.225** 
 (0.0865) (0.0573) (0.0879) (0.0637) (0.105) (0.0647) 
DefenseUS 0.234 0.212* 0.294* 0.246* 0.130 0.101 
 (0.121) (0.0925) (0.138) (0.104) (0.121) (0.112) 
Tradeshare 3.805** 3.559** 3.470** 3.439** 4.130** 3.816** 
 (0.536) (0.727) (0.647) (0.883) (0.545) (0.682) 
PowerUS -0.610** -0.0266 -0.585** 0.0582 -0.637** -0.122 
 (0.0693) (0.0997) (0.0782) (0.118) (0.0781) (0.102) 
Democracy -0.0276 -0.116** -0.0521 -0.143** -0.00550 -0.0767 
 (0.0389) (0.0370) (0.0483) (0.0343) (0.0450) (0.0595) 
Defense*Sanction -0.138* -0.126 -0.178** -0.0516 -0.0984 -0.240* 
 (0.0585) (0.111) (0.0635) (0.148) (0.0732) (0.106) 
DefenseUS*Sanction -0.0982 0.161** -0.112 0.0821 -0.0761 0.305** 
 (0.0571) (0.0615) (0.0732) (0.0746) (0.0669) (0.0741) 
PowerUS*Sanction -0.0283 0.0518** -0.0460* 0.0419* -0.0119 0.0693** 
 (0.0184) (0.0169) (0.0227) (0.0214) (0.0222) (0.0224) 
Democracy*Sanction -0.179** -0.140* -0.130* -0.0188 -0.228** -0.271** 
 (0.0449) (0.0572) (0.0528) (0.0705) (0.0621) (0.0697) 
Tradeshare*Sanction 0.133 0.227 0.272 -0.0499 0.0261 0.475 
 (0.501) (0.738) (0.565) (0.768) (0.550) (0.841) 
DefenseUS*Tradeshare 1.118 0.451 1.252 0.502 1.037 0.474 
 (0.866) (0.526) (0.962) (0.619) (0.882) (0.538) 
DefenseUS*Sanction*Tradeshare 1.647* 0.825 2.029* -0.182 1.203 1.522 
 (0.774) (1.210) (0.920) (1.509) (0.802) (1.166) 
MID*Sanction -0.0219 -0.0439 -0.193* -0.0712 0.154 -0.0115 
 (0.0830) (0.0501) (0.0971) (0.0505) (0.0979) (0.0514) 
Trade openess 0.0168** 0.00208** 0.0155** 0.00171** 0.0181** 0.00418** 
 (0.00199) (0.000440) (0.00206) (0.000329) (0.00209) (0.00122) 
Observations 243,327 143,778 235,212 139,394 231,880 138,222 
Dyads 8,257 10,149 7,852 9,782 7,663 9,695 
 
Table A2 Fixed effects Poisson models of target-third-state dyadic trade, including extra 
control for trade openness of third-state  
**p<0.01, *p<0.05.  Estimated coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by dyad in 







 Total bilateral trade 3rd state imports 
from target 
3rd state exports 
to target 
 1950-1991 1992-2006 1950-1991 1992-2006 1950-1991 1992-2006 
MID -0.0434 0.0463 0.0430 0.0577 -0.135* 0.0309 
 (0.0542) (0.0342) (0.0637) (0.0436) (0.0610) (0.0245) 
Sanction 0.212** -0.334** 0.200* -0.420** 0.216* -0.272** 
 (0.0790) (0.0635) (0.0945) (0.0839) (0.0944) (0.0889) 
Defense 0.263** 0.151* 0.276** 0.0879 0.253* 0.225** 
 (0.0907) (0.0592) (0.0913) (0.0647) (0.112) (0.0729) 
DefenseUS 0.520** 0.213* 0.609** 0.243* 0.385** 0.0520 
 (0.118) (0.0918) (0.131) (0.103) (0.126) (0.113) 
Tradeshare 3.192** 3.226** 2.813** 3.067** 3.544** 3.220** 
 (0.435) (0.699) (0.578) (0.849) (0.442) (0.642) 
PowerUS -0.548** -0.0243 -0.520** 0.0665 -0.585** -0.171 
 (0.0737) (0.0998) (0.0815) (0.117) (0.0806) (0.104) 
Democracy -0.00633 -0.119** -0.0302 -0.146** 0.0161 -0.0750 
 (0.0487) (0.0365) (0.0619) (0.0343) (0.0490) (0.0579) 
Defense*Sanction -0.187** -0.0985 -0.229** -0.0443 -0.147 -0.132 
 (0.0637) (0.108) (0.0656) (0.149) (0.0808) (0.0946) 
DefenseUS*Sanction -0.114* 0.152* -0.134 0.0835 -0.0870 0.247** 
 (0.0576) (0.0633) (0.0726) (0.0761) (0.0690) (0.0747) 
PowerUS*Sanction -0.00406 0.0515** -0.0189 0.0409 0.00964 0.0797** 
 (0.0186) (0.0171) (0.0216) (0.0215) (0.0234) (0.0228) 
Democracy*Sanction -0.249** -0.141* -0.169** -0.0221 -0.326** -0.261** 
 (0.0559) (0.0565) (0.0562) (0.0707) (0.0773) (0.0672) 
Tradeshare*Sanction 0.0467 -0.0321 0.214 -0.103 -0.0775 -1.443 
 (0.529) (0.792) (0.591) (0.791) (0.592) (1.103) 
DefenseUS*Tradeshare -1.164 0.439 -1.002 0.554 -1.293 0.275 
 (0.838) (0.525) (0.889) (0.614) (0.886) (0.545) 
DefenseUS*Sanction*Tradeshare 1.514 1.032 1.877 -0.0833 1.097 2.702 
 (1.014) (1.230) (1.000) (1.520) (1.149) (1.428) 
MID*Sanction -0.0471 -0.0406 -0.219* -0.0706 0.128 0.0196 
 (0.0811) (0.0502) (0.0951) (0.0500) (0.0975) (0.0539) 
Reliance3T 9.639** 0.995* 10.06** 0.703* 9.285** 4.152** 
 (2.276) (0.441) (2.037) (0.285) (2.771) (0.449) 
Observations 245,726 143,778 237,048 139,373 233,787 138,205 
Dyads 8,299 10,149 7,884 9,781 7,696 9,695 
 
 
Table A3 Fixed effects Poisson models of target-third-state dyadic trade, including extra 
control for third state economic reliance on the target state 
**p<0.01, *p<0.05.  Estimated coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by dyad in 





 Total bilateral trade 3rd state imports 
from target 
3rd state exports 
to target 
 1950-1991 1992-2006 1950-1991 1992-2006 1950-1991 1992-2006 
MID -0.0541 0.0472 0.0349 0.0588 -0.146* 0.0335 
 (0.0559) (0.0354) (0.0681) (0.0446) (0.0623) (0.0266) 
Sanction 0.121 -0.293** 0.112 -0.385** 0.125 -0.209** 
 (0.0850) (0.0597) (0.104) (0.0798) (0.101) (0.0783) 
Defense 0.372** 0.156** 0.405** 0.0927 0.344** 0.237** 
 (0.0812) (0.0567) (0.0806) (0.0636) (0.103) (0.0642) 
DefenseUS 0.428** 0.236* 0.495** 0.261* 0.319* 0.162 
 (0.130) (0.0938) (0.144) (0.104) (0.135) (0.114) 
Tradeshare 2.953** 3.505** 2.516** 3.442** 3.344** 3.596** 
 (0.668) (0.740) (0.733) (0.905) (0.693) (0.675) 
PowerUS -0.661** 0.0285 -0.605** 0.123 -0.715** -0.0690 
 (0.0873) (0.103) (0.0966) (0.121) (0.0939) (0.105) 
Democracy -0.0387 -0.115** -0.0680 -0.139** -0.0116 -0.0854 
 (0.0468) (0.0374) (0.0565) (0.0351) (0.0508) (0.0593) 
Defense*Sanction -0.230** -0.119 -0.270** -0.0515 -0.194* -0.222* 
 (0.0667) (0.114) (0.0672) (0.152) (0.0842) (0.107) 
DefenseUS*Sanction -0.0977 0.185** -0.119 0.119 -0.0679 0.312** 
 (0.0616) (0.0605) (0.0761) (0.0745) (0.0727) (0.0719) 
PowerUS*Sanction 0.00181 0.0477** -0.0157 0.0394 0.0178 0.0592** 
 (0.0194) (0.0167) (0.0234) (0.0206) (0.0234) (0.0219) 
Democracy*Sanction -0.207** -0.191** -0.124* -0.0719 -0.291** -0.321** 
 (0.0575) (0.0608) (0.0581) (0.0776) (0.0794) (0.0703) 
Tradeshare*Sanction 0.583 0.237 0.812 -0.0407 0.424 0.573 
 (0.573) (0.758) (0.604) (0.786) (0.628) (0.835) 
DefenseUS*Tradeshare -0.887 0.418 -0.712 0.472 -1.010 0.410 
 (0.979) (0.536) (0.999) (0.630) (1.037) (0.548) 
DefenseUS*Sanction*Tradeshare 1.306 0.811 1.648 -0.256 0.881 1.537 
 (1.066) (1.229) (1.044) (1.525) (1.188) (1.165) 
MID*Sanction -0.0511 -0.0477 -0.227* -0.0749 0.127 -0.0204 
 (0.0884) (0.0501) (0.104) (0.0508) (0.103) (0.0508) 
Comprehensive sanctions (FXM) 0.174** -0.330** 0.182** -0.303** 0.168* -0.320* 
 (0.0609) (0.0935) (0.0677) (0.0938) (0.0715) (0.142) 
Observations 245,726 143,778 237,628 139,394 234,295 138,222 
Dyads 8,299 10,149 7,893 9,782 7,702 9,695 
 
Table A4 Fixed effects Poisson models of target-third-state dyadic trade, including extra 
control for comprehensiveness of sanctions 
**p<0.01, *p<0.05.  Estimated coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by dyad in 





 Total bilateral trade 3rd state imports 
from target 
3rd state exports 
to target 
 1950-1991 1992-2006 1950-1991 1992-2006 1950-1991 1992-2006 
MID -0.0506 0.0445 0.0383 0.0555 -0.143* 0.0323 
 (0.0553) (0.0355) (0.0671) (0.0448) (0.0623) (0.0265) 
Sanction 0.180* -0.223** 0.177 -0.296** 0.177 -0.174* 
 (0.0866) (0.0646) (0.104) (0.0839) (0.101) (0.0847) 
Defense 0.358** 0.148* 0.387** 0.0816 0.334** 0.232** 
 (0.0839) (0.0595) (0.0836) (0.0667) (0.105) (0.0659) 
DefenseUS 0.430** 0.223* 0.500** 0.252* 0.317* 0.151 
 (0.131) (0.0935) (0.146) (0.104) (0.136) (0.115) 
Tradeshare 2.910** 3.462** 2.477** 3.416** 3.300** 3.555** 
 (0.658) (0.750) (0.722) (0.922) (0.684) (0.680) 
PowerUS -0.647** 0.0275 -0.588** 0.123 -0.705** -0.0707 
 (0.0871) (0.102) (0.0964) (0.120) (0.0936) (0.104) 
Democracy -0.0318 -0.110** -0.0606 -0.130** -0.00471 -0.0843 
 (0.0475) (0.0366) (0.0571) (0.0334) (0.0513) (0.0591) 
Defense*Sanction -0.220** -0.166 -0.262** -0.109 -0.181* -0.256* 
 (0.0673) (0.109) (0.0682) (0.142) (0.0845) (0.108) 
DefenseUS*Sanction -0.0968 0.167** -0.118 0.0916 -0.0673 0.310** 
 (0.0624) (0.0593) (0.0766) (0.0703) (0.0734) (0.0730) 
PowerUS*Sanction -0.00128 0.0484** -0.0184 0.0413* 0.0143 0.0594** 
 (0.0198) (0.0160) (0.0232) (0.0190) (0.0241) (0.0223) 
Democracy*Sanction -0.228** -0.106* -0.145* 0.0323 -0.314** -0.270** 
 (0.0629) (0.0510) (0.0640) (0.0588) (0.0814) (0.0681) 
Tradeshare*Sanction 0.627 0.742 0.855 0.556 0.470 0.922 
 (0.561) (0.778) (0.590) (0.784) (0.617) (0.862) 
DefenseUS*Tradeshare -0.859 0.480 -0.695 0.526 -0.970 0.465 
 (0.977) (0.544) (0.999) (0.642) (1.035) (0.552) 
DefenseUS*Sanction*Tradeshare 1.238 0.879 1.591 -0.164 0.804 1.564 
 (1.052) (1.267) (1.028) (1.586) (1.184) (1.187) 
MID*Sanction -0.0315 -0.0405 -0.203* -0.0611 0.143 -0.0194 
 (0.0826) (0.0490) (0.0983) (0.0506) (0.0991) (0.0505) 
Timeundersanction -0.0024 -0.0083** -0.0030 -0.0095** -0.00140 -0.00578* 
 (0.00373) (0.00193) (0.00455) (0.00217) (0.00352) (0.00227) 
Observations 245,726 143,778 237,628 139,394 234,295 138,222 
Dyads 8,299 10,149 7,893 9,782 7,702 9,695 
 
Table A5 Fixed effects Poisson models of target-third-state dyadic trade, including extra 
control for time under sanctions 
**p<0.01, *p<0.05.  Estimated coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by dyad in 





 Total bilateral trade 3rd state imports 
from target 
3rd state exports 
to target 
 1950-1991 1992-2006 1950-1991 1992-2006 1950-1991 1992-2006 
MID -0.102 0.0417 -0.0286 0.0615 -0.180** 0.0174 
 (0.0682) (0.0407) (0.0902) (0.0476) (0.0570) (0.0340) 
Sanction 0.0724 -0.291** 0.0583 -0.341** 0.0809 -0.250** 
 (0.0653) (0.0665) (0.0836) (0.0865) (0.0797) (0.0864) 
Defense 0.540** 0.120 0.557** 0.0465 0.524** 0.210** 
 (0.0811) (0.0719) (0.0833) (0.0790) (0.0905) (0.0765) 
DefenseUS 0.161 0.234** 0.241* 0.268** 0.0436 0.153 
 (0.108) (0.0865) (0.120) (0.0973) (0.112) (0.111) 
Tradeshare 4.229** 4.384** 3.897** 4.294** 4.550** 4.520** 
 (0.492) (0.586) (0.505) (0.754) (0.560) (0.523) 
PowerUS -0.380** -0.667** -0.399** -0.575** -0.370** -0.751** 
 (0.0605) (0.123) (0.0737) (0.156) (0.0667) (0.115) 
Democracy 0.000746 -0.0855** -0.0321 -0.108** 0.0315 -0.0562 
 (0.0268) (0.0298) (0.0343) (0.0293) (0.0357) (0.0504) 
Defense*Sanction -0.0223 -0.0956 -0.0520 -0.0289 0.00328 -0.190 
 (0.0573) (0.0867) (0.0591) (0.114) (0.0711) (0.0994) 
DefenseUS*sanction -0.106* 0.189** -0.131 0.114 -0.0702 0.319** 
 (0.0526) (0.0547) (0.0696) (0.0668) (0.0606) (0.0708) 
PowerUS*Sanction -0.0120 0.0446* -0.0266 0.0314 0.00132 0.0622** 
 (0.0145) (0.0177) (0.0194) (0.0225) (0.0180) (0.0223) 
Democracy*Sanction -0.115** -0.0719 -0.0389 0.0430 -0.194** -0.201** 
 (0.0429) (0.0428) (0.0472) (0.0514) (0.0633) (0.0665) 
Tradeshare*Sanction -0.550 0.528 -0.372 0.367 -0.681 0.705 
 (0.552) (0.587) (0.545) (0.600) (0.627) (0.690) 
DefenseUS*Tradeshare -0.971 0.594 -0.905 0.678 -0.999 0.552 
 (0.769) (0.535) (0.762) (0.620) (0.851) (0.565) 
DefenseUS*Sanction*Tradeshare 0.970 -0.403 1.367 -1.414 0.505 0.303 
 (1.050) (1.286) (1.019) (1.654) (1.169) (1.148) 
MID*Sanction -0.00719 0.00339 -0.168 -0.0369 0.158 0.0450 
 (0.110) (0.0570) (0.127) (0.0569) (0.115) (0.0576) 
Observations 245,726 143,778 237,628 139,394 234,295 138,222 
Dyads 8,299 10,149 7,893 9,782 7,702 9,695 
 
Table A6 Fixed effects Poisson models of target-third-state dyadic trade, including yearly 
time dummies 
**p<0.01, *p<0.05.  Estimated coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by dyad in 
parentheses. Controls for real GDP, population size, and yearly time dummies included but not 





 Total bilateral trade 3rd state imports 
from target 
3rd state exports 
to target 
 1950-1991 1992-2006 1950-1991 1992-2006 1950-1991 1992-2006 
MID -0.0375 0.0503 0.0420 0.0672 -0.127 0.0299 
 (0.0588) (0.0349) (0.0732) (0.0427) (0.0656) (0.0276) 
Sanction 0.217* -0.252** 0.212 -0.419** 0.215 -0.0890 
 (0.100) (0.0779) (0.126) (0.108) (0.123) (0.0919) 
Defense 0.463** 0.139 0.512** 0.107 0.427** 0.194** 
 (0.108) (0.0727) (0.0917) (0.105) (0.149) (0.0727) 
DefenseUS 0.332* 0.228* 0.404* 0.242* 0.210 0.164 
 (0.138) (0.104) (0.158) (0.120) (0.137) (0.121) 
Tradeshare3T 3.722** 3.423* 3.384** 3.506 4.006** 3.424** 
 (0.619) (1.339) (0.800) (1.815) (0.662) (1.085) 
PowerUS -0.647** -0.0514 -0.590** 0.0382 -0.704** -0.136 
 (0.0850) (0.106) (0.0915) (0.124) (0.0965) (0.109) 
Democracy -0.0258 -0.104** -0.0550 -0.126** 0.00230 -0.0762 
 (0.0471) (0.0402) (0.0556) (0.0373) (0.0538) (0.0629) 
Defense*Sanction -0.174* 0.103 -0.237** 0.234 -0.112 -0.0620 
 (0.0770) (0.0841) (0.0819) (0.144) (0.0958) (0.0703) 
DefenseUS*Sanction -0.136* 0.128 -0.164 0.0859 -0.0980 0.251** 
 (0.0672) (0.0664) (0.0839) (0.0842) (0.0819) (0.0720) 
PowerUS*Sanction -0.0119 0.0283 -0.0272 0.0344 0.00231 0.0201 
 (0.0229) (0.0203) (0.0293) (0.0267) (0.0285) (0.0245) 
Democracy*Sanction -0.194** -0.146* -0.0958 -0.00322 -0.290** -0.313** 
 (0.0569) (0.0600) (0.0540) (0.0734) (0.0809) (0.0693) 
Tradeshare*Sanction 0.164 0.812 0.0931 0.609 0.273 1.093 
 (1.029) (1.412) (1.093) (1.626) (1.102) (1.349) 
DefenseUS*Tradeshare -0.211 1.449 -0.139 1.467 -0.195 1.392 
 (0.980) (1.136) (1.069) (1.465) (1.014) (1.002) 
DefenseUS*Sanction*Tradeshare 0.244 -0.554 0.863 -1.777 -0.461 0.319 
 (1.439) (1.669) (1.404) (1.973) (1.615) (1.552) 
MID*Sanction -0.0472 -0.0438 -0.222 -0.0889 0.136 -0.00191 
 (0.0966) (0.0481) (0.119) (0.0490) (0.111) (0.0474) 
Constant  -11.80** -15.63** -14.79** -15.59** -9.921** -18.19** 
 (1.763) (2.523) (2.020) (2.353) (2.128) (2.896) 
Observations 236,962 147,242 237,405 147,252 237,374 147,259 
Dyads 8,417 10,767 8,421 10,767 8,420 10,767 
 
Table A7  Random effects Poisson models of target-third-state dyadic trade 
 
**p<0.01, *p<0.05.  Estimated coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by dyad in 
parentheses. Controls for real GDP, population size, distance, contiguity, common language, 
colony, and whether both dyad members are either islands or landlocked are included but not 
reported. 
 
 
